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Abstract
Cooperators that refuse to participate in sanctioning defectors create the second-
order free-rider problem. Such cooperators will not be punished because they
contribute to the public good, but they also eschew the costs associated with
punishing defectors. Altruistic punishers—those that cooperate and punish—are
at a disadvantage, and it is puzzling how such behaviour has evolved. We show
that sharing the responsibility to sanction defectors rather than relying on certain
individuals to do so permanently can solve the problem of costly punishment.
Inspired by the fact that humans have strong but also emotional tendencies for
fair play, we consider probabilistic sanctioning as the simplest way of dis-
tributing the duty. In well-mixed populations the public goods game is trans-
formed into a coordination game with full cooperation and defection as the two
stable equilibria, while in structured populations pattern formation supports
additional counterintuitive solutions that are reminiscent of Parrondoʼs paradox.
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1. Introduction
Widespread cooperation among unrelated individuals distinguishes humans markedly from
other species [1, 2]. Although common marmosets and chimpanzees show similar preferences
towards altruism and reward division [3–5], suggesting a long evolutionary history to the
human sense of fairness [6], no other living organism is as apt in taking full advantage of
collaborative efforts as humans. Indeed, we champion altruism and fairness [7, 8], and we are
willing to punish those who strive for excess beneﬁts by unfair means [9]. Besides individual
efforts aimed at punishing wrongdoers [10], our societies are home to a plethora of sanctioning
institutions [11], which are set up to ﬁne everything from overﬁshing to tax evasion. Recent
experiments in fact suggest that humans prefer pool punishment over peer punishment for
maintaining the commons [12]. But since sanctioning entails paying a cost for the free-riders to
incur a cost, the evolution of punishment, and perhaps even more so the evolution of
institutionalized punishment [13], is puzzling.
Seminal experiments by Fehr and Gächter [14, 15] revealed that alone the loom of
sanctioning has an immediate positive effect on the average contribution of players in the public
goods game [16, 17]. But it was only when the game was repeated many times over that the full
positive impact of punishment revealed itself. In the absence of punishment contributions
quickly decreased to marginal levels, while with punishment they rose to almost all players had
to offer. And this outcome prevailed even if the players knew they will never meet again in
subsequent rounds of the game. The essence of the puzzle, however, lays somewhat hidden in
the fact that in the rounds with punishment, the average income was usually below that without
punishment. This is due to the fact that punishment is costly [18]. Although the hope is that
once cooperation is established it can be sustained with signiﬁcantly smaller efforts, the
question that needs answering is: why should a self-interested individual contribute to costly
punishment in the ﬁrst place? Like forests, oil ﬁelds and grazing lands, the sanctioning
apparatus is a public good too, and it is therefore just as prone to exploitation and free-riding.
But since an individual may cooperate but not punish, the proe to be known as the second-order
free-rider problem [19].
Reputation has long been considered a key factor in models of cooperation [20, 21], and it
was suggested that individuals’ concern for their reputation may be a solution to the second-
order free-rider problem too [22]. Group selection has also been shown to play an important role
in the evolution of cooperative behaviour and altruistic punishment [23], and volunteering [24],
coordinated efforts between the punishers [25, 26], and the consideration of spatially structured
populations [27], have all been shown to stabilize punishment as well. These models assume,
however, that once an individual acquires the propensity to punish, it will do so permanently
until a strategy change, for example when imitating more successful strategies. Punishment is
thus considered as a deterministic act that is executed whenever needed. Yet human
experiments reject such a hypothesis, indicating instead that emotions are very much an integral
part of sanctioning. Xiao and Houser conclude that constraints on emotion expression can
increase the use of costly punishment, and that punishment itself may be used to express
negative emotions [28]. Moreover, Egas and Riedl [18] ﬁnd that their results are consistent with
the interpretation that punishment decisions come from an amalgam of emotional response and
cognitive cost-impact analysis.
Inspired by the important role that emotions play, we consider a public goods game where
cooperators are able to switch between contributing to the common pool and contributing to the
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common pool as well as punishing defectors in a probabilistic manner. The random exploration
of sanctioning mimics the stochastic effect of emotions on when and how humans choose to
punish [18, 28], and it also agrees with the outcome of recent experiments on human strategy
updating, which have revealed that spontaneous strategy changes corresponding to exploration
behaviour are in fact much more frequent than assumed thus far in theoretical models [29].
Although random explorations of strategies have been considered before in the realm of the
public goods game with voluntary participation [30, 31], our formulation of the game focuses
explicitly on the problem of costly punishment. Namely, even if the second-order free-rider
problem is assumed away so that every cooperator accepts the additional costs, the limits of
costly punishment are still obvious—if the costs exceed the ﬁnes punishment is likely to fail.
Here we show that this problem can be solved too, and that, rather counter-intuitively and
unexpectedly, second-order free-riders are the key to the solution.
The public goods game is played in groups of size n. Each cooperator (C) contributes an
amount c to the common pool, while defectors (D) contribute nothing. The sum of all
contributions in the group is multiplied by the enhancement factor r 1> and then split evenly
among all group members. Subsequently, a fraction p of cooperators within the group is
selected randomly and designated as punishers (P). If the group contains at least one punisher,
each defector in the group is punished with a ﬁne α. Punishers, on the other hand, equally share
the associated costs, each paying n n n( ) /C Pα− , where nC and nP are the number of cooperators
and punishers in the group, respectively. In agreement with these rules and if c = 1, the ﬁnal
payoff of a cooperator who does not punish is rn n/ 1C CΠ = − , while punishing cooperators
receive rn n n n n/ 1 ( ) /P C C PΠ α= − − − . Moreover, if there are no punishers in the group the
payoff of a defector is rn n/D CΠ = , while if n 0P > the payoff is rn n/D CΠ α= − . We
emphasize that the formulation of punishment in our model does not assume limitless resources
being at disposal to the punishers. The ﬁnes administered to defectors are covered in full by the
costs incurred to punishers. This ensures sustainability of sanctioning [32], but it also imposes a
heavy load on the punishers. In the worst case scenario, when a single punisher is surrounded
by n 1− defectors, the cost of punishment it has to bare is n( 1)− times the ﬁne α imposed on
each individual defector. The execution of punishment is therefore very costly, which was
traditionally considered a prohibitive factor for the success of sanctioning.
We study the described public goods game by means of the replicator equation in well-
mixed populations, as well as by means of Monte Carlo simulations in structured populations.
For details of the analysis we refer to the appendix, while here we proceed with the presentation
of the main results. As we will show, the consideration of probabilistic sanctioning alone
sufﬁces to solve the problem of costly punishment. To punish defectors becomes an effective
means to promote public cooperation even if the costs are much higher than the ﬁnes, as long as
second-order free-riders play an active role in the evolutionary process. More generally, our
results suggest that sharing the costs of any costly altruistic act may render it evolutionary stable
despite peer pressure from individually more proﬁtable strategies.
2. Results
2.1. Well-mixed populations
The replicator equation (see equation (3) in the appendix) deﬁnes the gradient of selection
f td /d , which determines the evolution of cooperative behaviour as illustrated in ﬁgure 1.
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Here f is the fraction of all the cooperators in the population. If the ﬁne α (see panel (a)) or the
probability to punish p (see panel (b)) is small, the gradient of selection is always negative.
Cooperators therefore die out regardless of the initial conditions. For sufﬁciently large values of
α and p a new unstable steady state emerges within the f (0.1)∈ interval, which divides the
system and gives rise to two basins of attraction. Depending on the initial conditions, the system
will evolve either towards full defection or towards full cooperation. Both f = 0 and f = 1 are
stable steady states, indicating that the probabilistic sanctioning transforms the public goods
game into a coordination game. The problem of costly punishment is thus solved, if only the
initial fraction of cooperators in the population is sufﬁciently large, and if the probability to
punish p and the administered ﬁne α are not too small. Moreover, the larger the value of α and
p, the larger the basin of attraction of the f = 1 steady state. However, the f = 0 steady state
always has a larger basin of attraction than the f = 1 steady state, because even if the initial
fraction of cooperators in the population is 0.5 the gradient of selection is always negative
for r n< .
We have also studied the replicator equation analytically in the limit of large α and p
values. The treatment is presented in the appendix, and the outcome is consistent with the
results presented in ﬁgure 1, which are thus always valid for well-mixed populations.
 
 
 
Figure 1. Probabilistic sanctioning in well-mixed populations transforms the public
goods game into a coordination game with full cooperation and full defection as the two
stable equilibria. Depicted is the gradient of selection in dependence on the fraction of
cooperators. Stable steady states f = 0 and f = 1 are depicted with solid circles, while the
unstable steady state is depicted with an open circle. Arrows indicate the expected
direction of evolution. Cooperation is favoured over defection if the arrow points to the
right. Panel (a) shows results for p = 0.5 and different values of α, while panel (b) shows
results for 0.5α = and different values of p. Other parameter values are r = 3.9
and n = 5.
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2.2. Structured populations
Unlike well-mixed populations, structured populations take into account the fact that the
interactions among players are typically not random but rather that they are limited to a set of
other players in the population, and as such are best described by a network. We therefore study
the evolution of cooperation on a square lattice, which is the simplest of networks to fulﬁl this
condition. We employ Monte Carlo simulations, as described in the appendix.
Colour maps presented in ﬁgure 2 depict the stationary fraction of cooperators in
dependence on the punishment ﬁne α and the probability to punish p for three intermediate
values of the multiplication factor r. Going from panels (a) to (c), we see that cooperative
behaviour becomes more and more common, which is expected given that the beneﬁts of
collaborative efforts increase through larger values of r. The impact of α and p is more subtle.
As the values of the two parameters increase along the diagonal in the pα − plane, the fraction
of cooperators ﬁrst increases, reaches a maximum, but then again decreases. Increasing either of
the two parameters while the other is kept constant returns the same observation. Both α and p
thus have a non-monotonous impact on the cooperation level. At smaller values of r (see panel
(a)) this distinctive feature is more pronounced, but it remains present at higher values of r as
well (see panel (b) and (c)). Probabilistic sanctioning thus promotes cooperative behaviour on
structured populations, yet it requires carefully measured efforts both in terms of severity and
frequency of punishment. Compared to well-mixed populations, this is a more complex
evolutionary outcome that is due to the interplay of spatial reciprocity and punishment.
2.3. Spatial patterns of cooperation
An understanding of the results presented in ﬁgure 2 can be obtained with the study of spatial
patterns that emerge under the inﬂuence of probabilistic sanctioning. In ﬁgure 3, we ﬁrst present
characteristic snapshots of the square lattice for three different values of p. When plotting the
spatial distributions of strategies, it is helpful to use different colours to distinguish cooperators
based on their propensity to punish. Cooperators that are randomly selected as punishers in at
least three of the ﬁve groups in which they are involved are depicted green, while other
cooperators are depicted blue. Defectors are depicted red. If punishment is not an option
Figure 2. Probabilistic sanctioning in structured populations promotes the evolution of
public cooperation, yet the optimal outcome requires carefully adjusted severity and
frequency of punishment. Colour maps encode the fraction of cooperators in
dependence on the punishment ﬁne α and the probability to punish p, as obtained for
multiplication factors r = 3.6 (a), r = 3.9 (b), and r = 4.2 (c).
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( p = 0), cooperators have to rely solely on spatial reciprocity to survive in the presence of
defectors. As panels (a)–(d) illustrate, cooperators form small yet compact clusters that protect
them from the invasions of defectors. This is the hallmark of network reciprocity, discovered
ﬁrst by Nowak and May [33]. It is important to note that in the absence of punishment the
interfaces that separate cooperators and defectors are not smooth. This creates ample
opportunities for defectors to invade successfully, but it also quickly leaves them surrounded by
players of the same kind. Since locally there is nobody left to exploit the invasion is stopped,
but it also creates new irregularities along the interface which will invite further invasions in the
future. The dynamical equilibrium of these elementary processes yields a stable coexistence of
cooperators and defectors. At the other extreme, if all cooperators are always ready to punish
( p = 1), the morphology of the spatial patterns is slightly different. As panels ( j) and (k)
illustrate, due to the consistent application of punishment the interfaces are somewhat smoother.
Figure 3. Spatial pattern formation reveals evolutionary advantages of probabilistic
sanctioning. In the absence of punishers ((a)–(d)) cooperators alone struggle to uphold
compact cooperative clusters. If everybody punishes the costs of sanctioning are
prohibitive to success and defectors win ((i)–(l)). If the responsibility to sanction is
shared 50 : 50 randomly, cooperative clusters remain compact and smooth, and at the
same time their ﬁtness is superior to that of defectors ((e)–(h)). The direction of invasion
therefore reverses and cooperators win. Cooperators who are willing to punish defectors
in at least three out of the ﬁve groups are depicted green, while other cooperators are
depicted blue. Defectors are depicted by red. Pie diagrams on the right show the
corresponding ratio of elementary invasions between different strategy pairs, conﬁrming
that probabilistic sanctioning tips the balance in favour of cooperation. We have used a
different shade of red to distinguish between D C→ and D P→ invasions. In all three
cases the evolution starts from a random initial state using r = 4 and 2α = . The system
size is 100 × 100.
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Individual defectors deep in the bulk of punishers struggle to invade because they are
immediately sanctioned. At the same time, the cost of sanctioning is shared by many punishers,
which conveys them a local evolutionary advantage. However, at the front where many
defectors meet with punishers the cost of sanctioning become prohibitive, and ultimately
defectors easily prevail (see panel (l)). If the application of sanctioning is probabilistic ( p = 0.5),
the direction of invasion is reversed. As illustrated in panels (e)–(h), defectors are eventually
completely eliminated from the population. This is because probabilistic sanctioning preserves
the smoothness of cooperative interfaces, while at the same time the mixture of pure cooperators
and punishers can prevail in the direct competition against defectors. Paradoxically, the option
to resort to second-order free-riding provides the necessary relief from the punishment costs,
which in turn maintains a healthy ﬁtness of the cooperative domains. The key to success is that
the costs of sanctioning are shared.
We have also monitored the elementary invasion processes between the competing
domains of strategies. The results of which are summarized as pie diagrams that depict the ratios
of different invasion steps at corresponding values of p at the right of ﬁgure 3. The pie diagrams
conﬁrm that the frequency of defector invasions for p = 0 and p = 1 is higher than the frequency
of cooperator invasions, which ultimately results in states where defection is widespread (see
panels (d) and (l)). For p = 0.5, on the other hand, the combined frequency of C D→ and
P D→ invasions is higher than the combined reverse, and as a result collectively the
cooperators rise to complete dominance. A careful comparison reveals further that the majority
of invasion steps that reduce the number of defectors is due to cooperators that do not punish. In
other words, second-order free-riders become stronger against defectors due to the probabilistic
presence of punishers. The pie diagrams also highlight that C can beat D only in the presence of
P, thus indicating that a multi-point interaction is necessary to observe the reported
counterintuitive phenomenon.
Our observations on structured populations can be summarized as ‘two weaker strategies
are able to form a stronger one’. This is reminiscent of Parrondoʼs paradox [34, 35], where two
losing games, if combined, can become a winning game. To determine exactly what mixture is
necessary between second-order free-riders and punishers, we compare the evolutionary
outcomes of three different variations of the studied public goods game. For clarity, we have
use a prepared initial state as depicted in the leftmost panels of ﬁgure 4, although the occupance
of cooperators and defectors is still equally split. The initial use of homogeneous strategy
domains simply helps to reveal the leading mechanism that is responsible for the emergence of
spatial patterns. Panels (a)–(d) depict the outcome of the traditional model where cooperators
can turn to punishers (and vice versa) probabilistically with probability p = 0.5. In agreement
with the results presented in ﬁgure 3, albeit at different parameter values, we can observe
complete dominance of cooperative behaviour (see panel (d)). Panels (e)–(h), on the other hand,
depict a very different outcome that emerges if pure cooperators and punishers are not allowed
to randomly switch roles. Strategy exchange is of course possible between all three competing
strategies, but this is the only way a pure cooperator can turn into a punisher or vice versa. The
evolution of the cooperative stripe illustrates convincingly that a simple mixture of C and P
players is unable to beat defectors. Indeed, pure cooperators (blue) can invade defectors only in
the close vicinity of punishers. Accordingly, pure cooperators are able to launch a short-lived
invasion into the territory of defectors, as shown in panel (f ). But as soon as pure cooperators
become isolated from the punishers due to the successful invasion, they themselves become
vulnerable again. The game is then effectively reset to the p = 0 case, which yields complete
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dominance of defectors at such a low value of the enhancement factor. An additional negative
consequence of spatiality is that pure cooperators and punishers will become separated via
neutral drift even if they were mixed at the beginning (see panels (f ) and (g)), and this too
favours defectors because head to head they are superior to both isolated strategies. Overall, it is
easy to see that neither type of mixture of permanent strategies can help to overcome the
problem of costly punishment.
Although the failure of a particular mixture of permanent strategies might suggest that only
the probabilistic combination of two ‘weaker’ strategies can produce a ‘winning’ strategy—in
analogy with the Parrondoʼs paradox [34, 35]—panels (i)–(l) are quick to convince us of the
contrary. Here pure cooperators and punishers are exchanged not randomly but periodically
after every round, and as can be observed in panel (l), this option too leads to complete
dominance of cooperative behaviour. The Parrondoʼs paradox can also be observed if the two
loosing games are exchanged periodically, thus strengthening the outlined analogy. We note
that the success of periodically shared costs might explain why working in shifts to share and
distribute heavy workload is common in human societies.
Figure 4. Sharing a costly altruistic act like punishment may render it evolutionary
viable regardless of the particularities that determine the method of sharing.
Probabilistic sharing ((a)–(d)) as well as periodic sharing ((i)–(l)) of sanctioning
reverse the direction of invasion and lead to complete dominance of cooperators. If
strategies are permanent and can change only via imitation, the spontaneous segregation
of pure cooperators and punishers will reveal the superiority of defectors against both
weaker strategies ((e)–(h)). In all three cases the evolution starts from an identical
prepared initial state using p = 0.5, r = 3.6 and 1α = . The system size is 100 × 100.
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In the remainder of this section, we turn to the explanation of the other counterintuitive
phenomenon, which is the non-monotonous dependence of the cooperation level on α. Since the
effect exists even at p = 1, as illustrated in ﬁgure 2, we focus on the simplest case when only D
and P players are initially present in the population. We know that if α is small, defectors are
ﬁned mildly and that thus this has a rather negligible negative impact on their payoffs. The same
holds true for punishers that have to bear small corresponding costs. Punishment in this case is
thus a second-order effect, in particular coming second to network reciprocity. As α increases,
however, the emerging spatial patterns receive further support from the ﬁnes imposed on
defectors, and gradually they spread across the whole population. The question to be answered
then is why the application of high α values starts to have a negative impact on the evolution of
cooperation? On the one hand, higher α imply higher costs to punishers, but at the same time,
defectors are ﬁned more severely as well. The key to understanding is again rooted in the spatial
patterns. More precisely, we have to clarify how the domain interfaces that separate the two
competing strategies move. Since the interfaces that separate clusters of the two competing
strategies become smooth due to the reduced payoff values on both sides, we focus on a typical
interface as illustrated in ﬁgure 5, and we analyse its stability in dependence on the punishment
ﬁne α.
The elementary changes that modify the interface in ﬁgure 5 are the invasions across the
line that separates unequal strategies. The leading invasions thereby are those which are marked
with arrows. Evidently, other elementary processes are also possible, but to consider them all
would make the following analysis untraceable. More importantly, the likelihood of the other
elementary processes (those not marked with an arrow) is much smaller, and hence their
contribution to the boundary velocity is negligible. Based on this, the average payoff difference
between the two strategies can be estimated as
r
3
2
5
5
24
, (1)P DΠ Π α− = − −
from where the critical value of the punishment ﬁne equals
r
24
5
3
2
5 . (2)cα = −⎜ ⎟
⎛
⎝
⎞
⎠
Figure 5. Schematic presentation of the interface that separates punishers and defectors.
The two leading elementary processes that contribute the most to the velocity of the
interface are marked by arrows. This setup is used for the stability analysis of competing
domains at p = 1, where only defectors and punishers are present. The analysis reveals
the ‘smaller is better’ effect in costly punishment, and it explains the non-monotonous
dependence of the cooperation level on the ﬁne α.
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At αc the direction of invasion between strategies P and D reverses, and it can be deduced that it
is indeed better to punish mildly. In particular, if cα α> then P DΠ Π< , which implies an
eventual dominance of defectors. Conversely, if cα α< then P DΠ Π> and punishers win.
These effects give rise to the non-monotonous dependence of the cooperation level on α, and
they corroborate previous theoretical and experimental work on costly punishment where a
similar ‘smaller is better’ effect has been reported before [36, 37]. We conclude by emphasizing
that this outcome remains valid also on other interaction networks, and that it is indeed the sole
consequence of the population being structured rather than well-mixed—a key point that should
not be overlooked in future human experiments.
3. Discussion
To summarize, we have shown that sharing a costly altruistic act like prosocial punishment can
be a game changer. Sharing, either probabilistic or periodic, can render the costly act
evolutionary viable, even though in the absence of sharing the act is obviously unable to grab a
hold in the population. We have focused on costly punishment as particular and frequently
studied example of such an act [9], and we have demonstrated that the consideration of
probabilistic sanctioning solves the problem of costly punishment. The question is no longer
whether punishers can survive alongside cooperators that refuse to punish, but rather is a
mixture of pure cooperators and punishers able to outperform defectors? An intuitive answer to
this question would be no, since neither cooperators nor punishers alone have an obvious
evolutionary advantage over defectors. Yet our study reveals the opposite. Two loosing
strategies are able to form a winning strategy if only they share the costs of the altruistic act—in
our case the costs of sanctioning. This counterintuitive evolutionary outcome is reminiscent of
the Parrondoʼs paradox [34, 35], where two losing games, if combined either probabilistically
or periodically, can become a winning game.
While in well-mixed populations probabilistic sanctioning simply transforms the public
goods game into a coordination game, in structured populations the evolutionary outcomes are
signiﬁcantly more interesting and versatile. The key to understanding the various solutions lies
in spatial pattern formation, and in particular in multi-point interactions that enable the
counterintuitive solutions. As we have pointed out, even if pure cooperators alone or punishers
alone are weaker than defectors, their stochastic or periodic combination can revert the direction
of invasion in favour of cooperative behaviour. This is made possible by the fact that the
presence of punishers strengthens cooperators that do not punish. The opposite is true as well,
but it works only if punishers are occasionally freed from their duty to sanction defectors.
During this time, however, it is crucial that other cooperators within the group take on the
responsibility and bare the additional costs. Multi-point interactions are a key ingredient for this
work, and the public goods game in particular, since being played in groups, is a paradigmatic
example of a game that enables just that. As soon as the option to abstain from punishing is no
longer given, the mechanism fails and the evolutionary process terminates either in full
defection or in a state of modest cooperation that is sustained solely due to network reciprocity.
Probabilistic exploration of strategies, especially when turning to imitation dynamics,
social learning or cultural evolution, appears to play an important role [29]. Recent experiments
indicate that human punishment may be motivated by inequity aversion rather than by the desire
for reciprocity [38], and evidence is mounting that emotions play a decisive role as well
10
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[18, 28]. Sanctions may also be motivated by selﬁsh or greedy intentions and spite, and if they
are, sanctioning can have dire consequences for altruistic cooperation and the evolutionary
advantages are questionable [39–41]. These considerations support the notion of probabilistic
sanctioning, and indeed it seems unreasonable to expect of individuals to execute punishment
either rationally or permanently. The presented results indicate that this alone may be reason
enough for punishment to become widespread in human societies. Moreover, given the nature
of the stick versus carrot dilemma [42], we expect the same conclusions to hold if punishment
would be replaced by reward.
Appendix: Methods
A.1. Replicator equation
The evolutionary dynamics of the studied public goods game in well-mixed populations is
determined by the replication equation of the fraction of all the cooperators f in the population
(regardless of whether they punish or not) [43]
[ ]f
t
f f
d
d
(1 ) , (3)X DΠ Π= − −
where p p(1 )X P CΠ Π Π= + − is the average payoff of all the cooperators while PΠ , CΠ and
DΠ are the average payoffs of punishing cooperators, second-order free-riders (cooperators that
do not punish) and defectors, respectively.
To study the evolutionary dynamics of f in an inﬁnite well-mixed population, we assume
that in each round of the game an interaction group is assembled by randomly selecting n
individuals from the population. The average payoffs PΠ , CΠ and DΠ are then
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respectively. The sought payoff difference is
r
n
pf
f
f
1 1 (1 ) 1
1
, (7)X D n 1Π Π α− = − + + − − −
−−⎜ ⎟⎛⎝
⎞
⎠ ⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
and the replicator equation can be rewritten as
f
t
f
r
n
f pf f
d
d
(1 ) 1 1 (1 ) (2 1) . (8)n 1α= − − + + − − −−⎜ ⎟
⎧⎨⎩
⎛
⎝
⎞
⎠ ⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
⎫⎬⎭
The stability analysis of equation (8) reveals that the evolutionary dynamics has two
boundary equilibria f = 0 and f = 1, and interior equilibria that are determined by the roots of the
function g f( ) X DΠ Π= − . It follows that for f0 0.5< ⩽ the second term of g( f) is negative.
Hence, when r n< , the function g f( ) 0< for all f (0, 0.5)∈ . On the other hand, for
f0.5 1< < , the function g( f) is strictly increasing since its ﬁrst order derivative is always
positive. We thus ﬁnd that there are no interior equilibria in f (0, 0.5)∈ , and that there is at
most one equilibrium in f (0.5, 1)∈ . Furthermore, the stability of the interior equilibria in
f (0.5, 1)∈ is determined by g r n p(1) 1 / [1 (1 ) ]n 1α= − + + − − − , from which we have the
following two conclusions:
(i) When r n p1 / [1 (1 ) ] 0n 1α− + + − − ⩽− (i.e., p 1 (1 )1
r
n
n
1
1⩽ − − α
−
− ), the replicator
equation has no interior equilibria in f (0, 1)∈ . Only f = 0 is a stable equilibrium, while
f = 1 is an unstable equilibrium.
(ii) When r n p n1 / [1 (1 ) 1] 0α− + + − − − > (i.e., p 1 (1 )
n
1 1
1
r
n> − − α
−
− ), there is only
one interior equilibrium f* in (0.5, 1), but it is unstable since g f( ) 0′ * > . The two boundary
equilibria f = 0 and f = 1, on the other hand, are both stable.
A.2. Monte Carlo simulations
The public goods game is staged on a square lattice with periodic boundary conditions where L2
players are arranged into overlapping groups of size n = 5 such that everyone is connected to its
four nearest neighbours. Accordingly, each individual belongs to ﬁve different groups. We note
that the square lattice is the simplest of networks that allows us to go beyond the well-mixed
population assumption, and as such it allows us to take into account the fact that the interactions
among humans are inherently structured rather than random. By using the square lattice, we
also continue a long-standing history that begun with the work of Nowak and May [33], who
were the ﬁrst to show that the most striking differences in the outcome of an evolutionary game
emerge when the assumption of a well-mixed population is abandoned for the usage of a
structured population. Many have since followed the same practice [36, 44, 45] (for a review
see [46]), and there exist ample evidence in support of the claim that, especially for games that
are governed by group interactions [47, 48], using the square lattice sufﬁces to reveal all the
relevant evolutionary outcomes, and also that these are qualitatively independent of the
interaction structure.
Initially each player on site x is designated either as a cooperator (s Cx = ) or defector
(s Dx = ) with equal probability. Monte Carlo simulations of the game are carried out
comprising the following elementary steps. A randomly selected player x plays the public goods
game with its four partners as a member of all the ﬁve groups, whereby its overall payoff sxΠ is
thus the sum of all the payoffs acquired in each individual group, as described in the
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Introduction. Next, player x chooses one of its nearest neighbours at random, and the chosen co-
player y also acquires its payoff syΠ in the same way. Finally, player x imitates the strategy of
player y with a probability given by the Fermi function K1/{1 exp [( )/ ]}s sx yΓ Π Π= + − ,
where K = 0.5 quantiﬁes the uncertainty by strategy adoptions [49], implying that better
performing players are readily adopted, although it is not impossible to adopt the strategy of a
player performing worse. Such errors in decision making can be attributed to mistakes and
external inﬂuences that adversely affect the evaluation of the opponent.
In agreement with the random sequential updating, each Monte Carlo step gives a chance
for every player to imitate the strategy from one of its neighbours once on average. As the key
quantity, we determine the fraction of all the cooperators f (regardless of whether they punish or
not) in the stationary state, which is considered to be reached when f becomes time-
independent. Depending on the actual conditions (proximity to phase transition points and the
typical size of emerging spatial patterns), the linear system size was varied from L = 100 to 400
and the relaxation time was varied from 104 to 105 MCS to ensure proper statistical accuracy.
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